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You sit in front of a wall, a computer beside you. There is a human interrogator on the 
other side of the wall, posing questions to both you and the machine. Their task is to try 
and determine who is human and who is not. What can you say to the interrogator to 
prove that you are a human being, different than the machine? How do you articulate 
your humanness? Would it help if the wall were made of glass, so you could explain it 
with your body? What if the computer were to assume the form of a well-designed, 
“Westworld”1-like being, a robot? What then are the properties that you possess that 
make you more than just an informational pattern (Moravec 1988, 109–110) trapped in 
flesh? 
 
What I aim to show with this inverted perspective on the Turing test
2
 is the way of 
thinking that has been popularized among philosophers and critical theorists of the 
postmodern era. The prefix ‘post’ alludes to an era radically and qualitatively different 
from the previous one (Klun 2014, 7), which, among others, employs a shift in 
discourse about the “basic unit of common reference for our species” (Braidotti 2019, 
23) by comparing it to what is historically understood as the other, the non-human. The 
product of this re-thought of a human being is named the posthuman. Even though it 
implies radicalism, it should not be understood apocalyptically - there still remains an 
element of continuity between the two. 
 
For the larger portion of human history, man regarded himself as superior to other 
species, employing his ownership and governance over nature, and, at the same time 
constructing the image of ‘self’ that delineated his value and agency as unattainably 
refined. Today, the same man finds himself among his creations that, in many ways, 
exceed his capabilities. Furthermore - some of those creations are becoming essential 
                                                 
1
 Westworld is a science-fiction TV series depicting an amusement park populated by “human-like 
androids” (IMDb), who are so lifelike, that they possess every single human attribute except one: they 
can be programmed and thus controlled. 
2
 This test was developed by Alan Turing as a method of assessing if artificial intelligence of a computer 
is capable of intelligent thinking and behaviour that would be indistinguishable from the capabilities of 
the human being. In the original test, both human and the machine are being interviewed through an 
interface - the computer is regarded as an intelligent, if it succeeds in the “imitation game” where its 




for man’s own survival. One could hardly imagine a ‘productive’ life without the vast 
chasm of information available at our fingertips so readily. Our lives would be 
significantly poorer and shorter without the biomedical engineering that creates life-
enhancing and life-saving technologies. The so-called NBIC (nanotechnology, 
biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science) and GRAIN (genetic 
manipulation, robotics, artificial intelligence, and nanotechnology) sciences  (Wilson 
and Haslam 2009, 249) together offer the enhancement of human life: prolonging it 
beyond the “nature’s plan” with prescription drugs and operations, assisting our 
cognitive (e.g. enhancement of attention, memory formation and retainment with 
nootropics) and physical (e.g. bionic prosthetics) abilities and even engineering human 
tissue (e.g. implantation of artificially grown bladders). The border of natural and 
artificial is being blurred to such a measure that the subject on the receiving end of 
those technologies can arguably no longer be called unambiguously human (Wilson and 
Haslam 2009, 249).  
 
A new science of communication and engineering between an animal, human and the 
machine (Wiener 1948), namely modern cybernetics
3
, creates devices widely used in 
war; predicting and tracing the flight of enemy bombers and even allowing their own 
responsive maneuvering to steer clear of hostile ground-fire (Graham 2002, 181–184). 
One of those, The Tor, also called the SA-15 Gauntlet by NATO, was recently used to 
identify and shoot down Ukrainian flight 752 in Iranian airspace (president.ir). 
Cybernetics pioneer Norbert Wiener considers the war aircraft and the pilot functionally 
inseparably linked. According to Wiener, their interactive and dependent relationship 
positions them as one single entity, the human becoming a part of the servomechanism 
itself (1989, 26). While this cybernetic aspect of the (post)human requires ethical 
consideration of responsibility and accountability that should not be disregarded
4
, it also 
                                                 
3
 The broader and earlier understanding of principles of cybernetics (Greek kybernḗtēs, “steersman”) as a 
system of communication and control can be traced way back to ancient Greek mathematician Ktesibios 
(fl. 285–222 BCE). His water clock, the clepsydra, was a self-regulating cybernetic system, as it was 
based on a mechanism of a plug-type regulator that was controlling the amount of water that powered the 
clock. No human interference was needed for the clock to show the time. This remained the most accurate 
way to measure time until the invention of the pendulum clock in 1656 (more on that in Nocks 2007, 10-
15). 
4
 Those cases are becoming a complicated moral (and legal) landscape: for now, we tend to think that it 





has implications on a metaphysical and philosophical-anthropological level of the 
discussion. Nevertheless; to discuss the new technologically interlinked situation of the 
human, one does not need to have one’s own body modified or dependent on an 
artificial entity (Hayles 1999, 4) at all times. One does not need to be a war pilot to 
understand and on some level identify with his situation, and the re-construction of 
subjectivity that it implies (Hayles 1999, 4).  
 
Another in the line of man’s creations is artificial intelligence (AI). Designed to use 
machine  (unsupervised) learning algorithms, AI is being described as the one who 
“thinks”, “knows”, “understands”, “differentiates”, “perceives” (Turing 1950, 433), all 
verbs previously used for humans alone. The research is this field has produced 
“systems that exhibit a certain independence from human decisions” (Roden 2015, 5). 
Even the physical ‘bodies’ of robots are becoming increasingly human-like (Hanson 
Robotics 2020). It seems like the general aim of these technologies is to reach the point 
of our creations being so incredibly proximal to the workings of the human brain that a 
human interrogator would not be able to distinguish between “them” and us. 
But what does that mean for humans? How would we describe ourselves and prove our 
humanness (somehow analogous to the reCAPTCHA
5
 asking us, if we indeed are 
human today)? How does the technological advancement change the idea of the 
“historically specific construction, called the human” (Hayles 1999, 2)? Advocates 
(Bostrom, Hughes) of these new (bio)technological developments argue that these kind 
of augmentations serve human nature itself, making humans progressively more, or 
better at being, human. Opponents (Fukuyama, Habermas, Kass) posit that the same 
degrades humanity to something less than human. But, both would agree that the 
application of ‘modification technologies’ and the need to relate and compare ourselves 
to an pre-nonexistent intelligence is changing the way we perceive ourselves thus (soon) 
classifying us as posthuman.  
                                                                                                                                               
takes on a better part of decision making, the legal line of responsibility becomes blurred. In that case, 







All of the above alludes to sometime exciting, if not an anxiety-inducing “de-centering 
of ‘Man’, once the measure of all things
6
” (Braidotti 2013, 2), who’s corporeal 
boundaries and categories slowly melt. While it becomes possible for technology to 
intervene in the areas, actions and bodies previously reserved for humans, the social and 
individual self-understanding may become fundamentally altered. This leads to general 
uneasiness and dissatisfaction with the dominant understanding of who and what 
exactly the human subject is, as put forward by the liberal humanistic representational 
habits (Braidotti 2019, 26; Hayles 1999, 5). A new definition of what it means to be 
human is needed, and this new definition also affects the way we (will) think and act 
about the world in general. 
 
What is new in the postmodern era is the plurality of philosophical approaches to the 
interpretation and understanding of this ‘new’ self. All, transhumanism, anti-humanism 
as well as both critical and speculative posthumanism, try to pose a critique to the 
dominant understanding of humanity, as portrayed by humanism (that they deem 
obsolete). Most can be understood as experimentations, tools for re-thinking the 
metaphysical models for representing humanness concerning the new forms of 
subjectivities that are emerging.  
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 1. Re-thinking the human 
 
A multiplicity of engagements with aforementioned observations of the technological 
advancements are being put forward. They all share the idea that the contemporary 
humanistic notion of the human does not reflect who we are anymore (or never did so 
aptly, or can be elaborated and ‘upgraded’), but provide different solutions to that 
critique. Posthumanisms thus employ different approaches, what may lead to 
methodological and theoretical confusion. This thesis will briefly touch on those 
different approaches in a hope to portray what is/can be meant under the term 
posthuman. The brief portrayal is rather selective, as the variations on the theme are 
numerous. 
 
Furthermore, the use of the terminology differs across theories: while all of them use 
the conglomerate term posthuman to label the subject that comes after the old/present 
one, they do indeed differ greatly in what the content of that posthuman is. 
 
It is a never-ending task to try to map those engagements precisely - the understanding 
of the same umbrella term (e.g. posthumanism) usually varies in shades and degrees 
between different authors. When needed, I portray two versions of the philosophical 
theory discussed - a strong and weak version of the claim. They are ordered in a way 
that shows their main differences and relationships as clear as possible, starting with 
technological posthumanism. The following posthumanisms are discussed separated 
from technological posthumanism, as they reflect a diametrically opposed, to anti-
humanism and post-anthropocentrism related, critique. 
 
 
1.1 Technological posthumanism 
 
The notion is often used interchangeably with the term transhumanism. 
 
The term transhumanism alludes to a transitional phase between the past human and the 




between. The prefix ‘trans’ thus stands as a shorthand for ‘transition’. According to this 
school of thought, the classical notion of the human is inadequate because it is fixed, 
therefore not accounting for the laws of evolutionary change. The Homo Sapiens’ brain 
is three times larger than that of his ancestors (Du et al. 2018), as it evolved to process 
more information about its environment to be able to respond to its challenges and 
better his/her chances of survival. Even though the human brain still has some room to 
develop and grow (or better - crumble) to reach its maximum processing capacity 
(Hofman 2014, 2), transhumanists believe that this kind of human enhancement can be 
reached by other, technological means as well. Integration of technology to our biology 
has been our strategy of survival since the development of flint tools (Roden 2015, 16) 
and in this sense, we have always been “Natural-Born Cyborgs” (Clark 2004). As of 
today, not just physical, but also a lot of cognitive workload is being strategically off-
loaded from the human brain to artificial intelligences (e.g. spell-check and auto-
correct), but according to transhumanists, machines have the possibility to elaborate on 
that, to convert the universe to an “extended thinking entity” (Moravec 1988, 116) and 
the Homo Sapiens to Homo Cyberneticus (Young 2006, 34).  
 
The human of the past is thus going through a phase in which some of us, the ones 
already using the NBIC sciences to better ourselves, are transhuman. This 
transformation is being understood as an evolutionary favoured and beneficial 
forasmuch as it strives to perfect human nature and morphology (Roden 2015, 9; 13), 
which will reach its peak when the entire human race transforms fully, becoming 
posthuman. Authors differ in their speculations and hopes for how this posthuman 
future will look like. The weak form of transhumanism holds back from this kind of 
assessment and promotes the general quality enhancement of life without fundamentally 
changing the human condition. British evolutionary biologist Huxley’s
7
 position could 
be considered as such: “The human species can, if it wishes, transcend itself – not just 
sporadically, an individual here in one way, an individual there in another way, but in 
its entirety, as humanity. We need a name for this new belief. Perhaps transhumanism 
will serve: man remaining man, but transcending himself, by realizing new possibilities 
of and for his human nature” (Huxley 1957, 17). The strong claim, on the other hand, 
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strives to completely overcome the limits of human nature by the means of mind-
uploading
8
, the creation and deployment of decision making to unbiased Artificial 
General Intelligence (AGI)
9
, alternate virtual reality lives (Roden 2015, 16–18) etc.  
 
Transhumanism can be thus introduced as a primarily ethical claim. Technological 
enhancement (with drugs or genetic manipulation) or reproduction of human capacities 
(e.g. AGI, where the range and flexibility of human reasoning is being approximated, 
but the inherently human inclination towards the differentiation between ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ is eliminated) is a desirable aim because it may be offering the solutions to some 
common and persistent human problems, such as “ruinous moral dispositions” (Roden 
2015, 18) we can often hold. 
 
Regarding its implied ontology, transhumanism is a naturalism with an inherently 
dualistic inclination (Hayles 1999, Young 2006, 34). It is dualistic as far as it 
emphasises the importance of mind over the body, especially obvious in the ideas of the 
strong form of transhumanism, e.g. mind uploading. The belief in the possibility of 
mind uploading implicates that the self is identical with the mind, the sole pattern of 
information
10
, which could therefore be supported by different bodies: either the fleshy 
one or the one of the machine. The body we were born with is then, as Hayles puts it, 
the “original prosthesis” that can always be replaced without affecting the identity of 
the self” (1999, 5). But, even if we accept the premise that the same computational 
processes would create a consciousness both in “a kind of protein computer” (brain) and 
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 Mind uploading is a hypothetical technology which would allow for ‘scanning’ of human mental states 
and uploading or running them on the computer. The uploaded mind would still be regarded as a 
conscious mind, only on a different substrate. 
9
 While today’s artificial intelligences (AI) solve a lot of the tasks better and faster than an average 
human being, those AI are domain-specific. In general (regarding the spectrum of tasks that we can 
solve), humans are still better task-solvers. AGI is a hypothetical machine intelligence that would be able 
to master any task that a human being can. 
10 As explained in patternism: “The specific set of particles that my body and brain comprise are in fact 
completely different from the atoms and molecules that I comprised only a short while ago. We know that 
most of our cells are turned over in a matter of weeks, and even our neurons, which persist as distinct 
cells for a relatively long time, nonetheless change all of their constituent molecules within a month....I 
am rather like the pattern that water makes in a stream as it rushes past the rocks in its path. The actual 
molecules of water change every millisecond, but the pattern persists for hours or even years.” (Kurzweil, 




in a “silicone computer”
11
 (Bostrom, Cronopis magazine), this does not suffice for the 
continuity of that same consciousness as its first-person subjective experience. 
A transhumanist solution to that last problem is singularity, as explained by Kurzweil 
(2005). This is where the new artificial instantiation of the consciousness involves the 
“data capture” as well as a creation of the virtual “dynamic entity”, including not only 
the cognitive, but also the bodily aspect of the subject, thus preserving the first-person 
subjective experience. What is new in singularity and virtual bodies is shown by the 
comparison“ between a computer program that resides on a computer disk (a static 
picture) and a program that is actively running on a suitable computer (a dynamic, 
interacting entity)” (Kurzweil 2005, 201). This changes the strong dualistic claim to a 
combination of weak dualism (as far as the “mind” can still emerge from different 
physical substrates) and reductive materialism, where understanding the physical brain 
system (be it biological or not) is equivalent to understanding the workings of the mind 
(Herzfeld 2002, 19). It still does not account for the continuity of the first-person 
subject experience, even though it can provide non-continuous first-person experience. 
 
Dualistic inclinations of transhumanism are evident in its weak form as well. Using the 
language of control - over our emotions, memory, mind, and ultimately bodies (Hughes 
2014, 143) by reducing its pain, disease and disability - implies twofold being: the 
unchanging part that enacts control, and the changeable body and mind that still remains 
to be bettered. Further elaboration on the nature of this relationship between the self and 
its own mind and body remains unaddressed by the proponents of weak transhumanism. 
(Thweatt-Bates 2012, 78) 
 
Summing them up, the basic metaphysical and anthropological predispositions of 
transhumanism are dualistic in two ways: 
 1. There exists a dichotomous opposition of nature and technology. 
 2. There exists a clear difference between body and mind/soul. Subjective experience 
is thus understood as a sole cluster of computational patterns (as the experience, 
including the experience of possession of a body can be virtually simulated) in 
opposition to the material substrate on which the subjective experience is “running”. 
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Ultimately, the core of the transhumanist posthuman remains pinpointed in the agency 
of the autonomous rational mind, being built on contemporary humanism itself, 
providing a “modernised” version of it, but maintaining the values of the Renaissance 
ideal. Human remains the measure of all things, even though it bestows its morality to 
other, artificial entities as well. In transhumanism, other living beings are still inferior 
insofar as they do not possess the attributes that have been historically put forward as 
the source of human pride and personhood: rationality, individual expression and 
thought. Even more so, transhumanists understand the human as an entity 
fundamentally inclined towards his posthuman future as elaboration on those attributes 
through application of science.  
 
 
1.2 Anti-humanism and post-anthropocentrism 
 
Appreciation of the scope of posthumanism requires that two connected, but not 
identical notions are examined: anti-humanism and post-anthropocentrism. They are 
relevant because they began a critical line of thought that is a common notion in 
posthumanism as well. One could argue that the emergence of anti-humanism during 
the mid to late 20th century is the root for the latter development of both post-
anthropocentrism and posthumanism (Braidotti 2013, 37–51). The explanation of their 
genealogy can thus also provide some of the background for posthumanistic ideas. 
 
While transhumanism builds on the values of modern rationality, progress and free will, 
which we usually attribute to humanism, both anti-humanism and post-
anthropocentrism employ a rather radical critique of it. Humanism’s rejection by the 
two observed notions is deeply connected to the historical political context of 20th 
century: colonialism, Auschwitz, Hiroshima and the Gulag - to which social movements 
of 1960/70-ties were reacting in a form of de-colonization, feminism, anti-racism, anti-
nuclear and pacifist movements (Braidotti 2013, 16). The social exercise of humanism 
is portrayed by Braidotti as a “normative convention”, being used to exclude and 
discriminate. It takes a specific “mode of being human” as a universal standard (namely 




categorical and qualitative difference between the standard ‘man’ and the thus 
marginalised: women, people of colour, lower classes, animals. Clearly, the human 
nature of ‘man’ is a social convention that does not paint a true statistical average of all 
modes of humanness (ibid. 26). Humanism is therefore deemed responsible for social 
practices of injustice and domination (ibid. 20). 
 
While those social circumstances produced social movements, a similar line of thought 
was being developed in philosophy simultaneously. Humanism is definitely a multi-
faceted notion, but its glorification of reason and human uniqueness regarding its 
nature, as well as the metaphysical claims that steam from both, were the main points of 
the postmodern philosophical critique (Roden 2015, 10–11; Ranisch and Sorgner 2014, 






An idea is humanistic if it distinguishes and privileges the human from a non-human 
based on his attributes that are understood as a part of innate human nature or essence, 
often represented as ratio.
13
 In the history of western philosophy up until modernity, a 
thinking subject was the one representing beings as objects, mapping this subject-object 
duality to other dualisms as well: essence vs. existence, form vs. matter, eternal vs. 
temporal, substance vs. accident etc. In humanism, one of these binary oppositions is 
often privileged, most evidently in the subject-object duality in which the man as a 
subject becomes the measure and the centre of beings that remain his objects. 
 
The birthplace of anti-humanism was France, where it was tightly knit with the 
subversion of structuralism and formalism. The shift can be most apparently portrayed 
with the Foucaultian “death of Man” (1966, The Order of Things). According to 
Foucault, “the moral humanisms and the historical dialectics of Christian, Marxist, and 
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 Other important, but to the discussion not directly relevant, were critiques of: human language 
accurately representing reality, the “human subject being the foundation of inherent political rights that 
demand political representation, and that the human species is superior to non-humans and can use 
natural resources solely for its own benefit” (Ranisch and Sorgner 2014, 50; Klun 2014 8-9). 
13
 “But if one understands humanism in general as a concern that man become free for his humanity and 
find his worth in it, then humanism differs according to one's conception of the "freedom" and "nature" of 





Existentialist affiliation had run their course” (Miernowski 2016, XV). He argues that 
the notion of a Man is a symptom of modernity, a “recent invention” and historical 
construction created by the sciences of anthropology, psychology, biology and 
economics, an institutionally created fiction deemed to die off soon. He rejects the study 
of Man as a universal category. Just as the modern period rejected the idea of God as 
something not worthy of study itself and replaced it with the Man, Foucault is 
predicting the imminent displacement of the Man and its replacement with something 
else. The “death of Man” thus alludes to Nietzschean “death of God.” (Han-Pile 2010, 
118-139) Foucault and other French thinkers, named as post-structuralists, were trying 
to develop a third way of dealing with human subjectivity, one that would go past the 
dualisms used to denote it so far. They identified a crisis that was both moral and 
epistemological in nature and attributed it to the “humanistic arrogance of continuing to 
place Man at the centre of world history” (Braidotti 2013, 23) as a unitary and 
hegemonic royalty over the other. (Braidotti 2013, 20-23) 
 
Anti-humanism is asking the human agent to uncouple himself from the humanistic, 
normative universal attitude and to start speaking of himself in the same way as to how 
he is enacting himself. Foucault’s position is just one out of many forms of anti-
humanisms which emerged across many disciplines, not just philosophy. It would be, as 
with transhumanism, wrong to assume that anti-humanism is a unified or uniformed 
camp, but its authors (to a certain degree) opposed the understanding of human as an 
“epistemological starting point (the subject as the foundation of all possible knowledge) 
or as a practical agent (human consciousness as the main operator and focus of 
historical development as in Hegelian history)” (Han-Pile 2010, 118-119). The idea of 
the Man was being deconstructed (Braidotti 2013, 23). The notion of ‘human nature’ 
became undermined by a conviction that, while it indeed exists, it is a historical and 
cultural discursive tool and can thus be changed to better fit the “condition” (Braidotti 
2013, 24) of the human today. The need to replace the old “grand narrative” was met 







Western humanism is also anthropocentric, as far as it attributes a superlative status to 
the human being (Roden 2015, 11) who diverges from other beings in his ability to 
transcend nature. It was built on biblical ideas of human dominion over nature (Genesis 
1,26) and most prominently elaborated in the 18
th
 century by Immanuel Kant. 
According to Kant, humans are not only able to represent the world, but can also endow 
it with value, form or meaning. Humans are the only ones capable of being ends-in-
themselves, making animals means to human ends: “The beings whose existence rests 
not on our will but on nature nevertheless have, if they are beings without reason, only a 
relative worth as means, and are called things; rational beings, by contrast, are called 
persons, because their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves, i.e., as 
something that may not be used merely as means, hence to that extent limits all arbitrary 
choice (and is an object of respect)” (Kant 2002 [1785], 46). The discontinuity between 
the human and animal is often placed in humans being as (animal) rationale - 
transcending the animal with ratio allows the formation of culture, free will, ethics and 
morality. 
 
The denial of the ultimate primacy and intrinsic value of man is, as a reply to the 
anthropocentric inclination of humanism, the main act of post-anthropocentrism
14
. It is 
justified by the following argument: “humans cannot know what the needs of other 
species are as we can perceive the world and morality only with our own senses” 
(Kopnina 2019, 3). Anthropocentrism is then deemed to not able to truly value 
nonhuman beings outside of their instumental/economic usefulness and is therefore 




This tension between humanism, anti-humanism and post-anthropocentism of 
postmodern thinkers was the breeding ground from which the posthumanism debate 
arose. By rejection of the unitary subject of humanism (Braidotti 2013, 26) understood 
as opposed to the otherness (Braidotti 2013, 27) of sex, race, and nature, anti-humanism 
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and post-anthropocentism seek to replace it with a different narrative of the self, which 
is yet to be defined. It is important to note that they do not completely cut ties with 
humanism, at times still employing the intrinsic humanist discursive values (Braidotti 
2013, 29). Anti-humanism and post-anthropocentrism are not necessary, but definitely 
historically important for our understanding of posthumanisms which seek to explore 
alternatives of conceptualising the human subject. 
 
 
1.3 (Critical) philosophical posthumanism = anti-humanism 
 
Previously discussed anti-humanism is a term identical to philosophical posthumanism. 
Main figures in this branch are Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault (Ranisch and 
Sorgner 2014, 50). Its main critique focuses on fundamentalism of western 
philosophical tradition and “supposed anthropocentrism of modern philosophy and 
intellectual life” (Roden 2015, 5). It aims to demystify metaphysical polarisations. 
 
It is also the most widely (mis)used term, sometimes used as an umbrella term for the 
following posthumanisms, too.  
 
 
1.4 (Critical) cultural posthumanism 
 
The ideas of anti-humanism were, after the mid-nineties, broadcasted from philosophy 
to other fields as well - mainly to literary criticism along with cultural and science-
fiction studies, which gave rise to cultural posthumanism (Ranisch and Sorgner 2014, 
51). Cultural posthumanism is distinct on account of its interdisciplinary approach; its 
main figures combine critical theory and technology (Donna Haraway and Bruno 
Latour), feminism (Rosi Braidotti), bioethics (Cary Wolfe) and cultural studies 
(Katherine Hayles, Jean-François Lyotard), but more or less still using the 
deconstructive lens. This cultural recuperation is a call for dialogue between sciences 
and the new humanities, namely posthumanities (Braidotti 2019, 93). The adjective 




ideas, and at the same time alludes to classical critical methodologies that it uses to self-
reflect and review. 
 
The genealogy of critical posthumanism can be, because of its deconstructive lens, 
understood as a response to the duality of humanism and its opposition in post-
anthropocentric anti-humanism. Critical posthumanism acknowledges the decline of 
humanism and its secularly defined rational subject, destined to reach perfection 
through universal values. It does, nonetheless, not entail a clear fissure with humanism, 
but more so serves as a discursive framework that is reminding itself of pitfalls of 
strong anthropocentrism and binary oppositions. Its task lies in mapping the new 
understandings of the human and, through this reiteration, offering a non-generic, non-
simplistic and true to the time answer to the question of “What does it mean to be 
human?”. Cultural posthumanism understands the notion of the human as being purely 
ideologically constructed, which differentiates it greatly from transhumanism. While 
transhumanism imagines a certain developmentally elaborated posthuman future for the 
human society, cultural posthumanists claim that we were never truly human in the first 
place - humans were never the autonomous or metaphysically complete entities that 
they deem themselves to be (Hauskeller 2014, 104). What we historically understood as 
man, fell short in depicting a human being, as it was quick to exclude women, people of 
color, homosexuals, etc. If the human indeed exists just as a cultural construct, then 
nothing is restricting us from saying that we are, as soon as we start including the 
previously neglected, already posthuman today (Hayles 1999, 286; Braidotti 2019, 108). 
Posthuman is, just as the human, not a kind of entity in itself, but rather a different way 
of understanding and explaining our existence. “People become posthuman because 
they think they are posthuman” (Hayles 1999, 6). Thereby the word posthuman has an 
integrative function, making it the antipod of the human (or the man).  
 
While transhumanist agenda is achieved by literal technological means, the hybrid of 
human and technology in cultural posthumanism primarily serves as a metaphor: the 
cyborg, as discussed in Donna Haraways A Cyborg Manifesto (1991) is the one to 
challenge the persisting binary oppositions of the West, fusing the animal and the 
machine, mind and body, culture and nature, male and female etc., creating a “collective 




experience” (ibid. 149), aptly representing the social reality which is never 
homogenous. It is at the same time mapping the present social reality and “suggesting 
some very fruitful couplings” (ibid. 149) for which Haraway wishes to happen in the 
near future. Furthermore, while transhumanist posthuman is achieved by technological 
transcendence, cultural posthumanists do not necessarily understand technological 
advancement as the main prerequisite for the social change/transcendence they aim 
for
15
. Even inversely - the crisis of the man is, in some way, evident in the technology 
itself, as the dissolution of categorical distinctions between the human and other are 
made to profit contemporary market economies as “advanced capitalism and its bio-
genetic technologies engender a perverse form of the posthuman” (Braidotti 2013, 7). 
Cultural posthumanists, nevertheless, continue to stress the importance of inclusion of 
technological environment as a constitutive factor when speaking of selves 
(“technology’s integration into human identity”) and steer away from self-enclosed 
definitions of human beings (Botz-Bornstein 2015, 11-12; Braidotti 2019, 107-108). 
 
This also implies that cultural posthumanism does not support the dualistic 
anthropological claims put forward by transhumanists. For the posthuman of cultural 
posthumanism, mere replacement of body parts with technological devices does not 
change the metaphysics of selfhood, as long as we lack the change of consciousness 
(Botz-Bornstein 2015, 12-13). Cultural posthumanism is actively seeking a 
metaphysical framework that would incorporate forms of interaction, influence and 
agency (Ranisch 2014, 175-176). This is evident in their understanding of conscious 
experience, which is no longer resting in the brain alone, but distributed “through the 
whole body, and even into the environment” (Hayles 1999, 289-290; Braidotti 2019, 
105, 107, 109 etc.). The transhumanist suggestion of mind-body dualism becomes 
unacceptable as the relation between consciousness (traditionally understood as 
memories, feelings and other mental states) and the world is no longer limited neither to 
subjectivism nor objectivism. The human as an embodied agent creates its world by 
affiliation and relation to other entities, defined not by autonomy of rationality, but 
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 Haraway herself said it in the interview with Logic: “I’m very pro-technology, but I belong to a crowd 
that is quite sceptical of the projects of what we might call the “techno-fix,” in part because of /…/ their 
disengagement from communities of practice. /…/ I’m against the kind of techno-fixes that are abstracted 




autonomy of affectionate bonds (Braidotti 2019, 105-106). And because the ability to 
relate is not limited to human subjects, its identity as the man or Anthropos is no longer 
suitable. The dissolution of identity thus happens on two accounts: 
 1) The boundary between insideness and outsideness is shattered, the subject becoming 
an “assemblage” (Braidotti 2019, 106-107) rather than an unitary being. This 
happens on the horizontal axis, our cognition extended to our environment making 
the distinction between the subject and its environment blurry. It is emerging from 
and integrated in the world (Hayles 1999, 290). This works the other way around 
too, as the environment becomes by human actions “ambiguously [both] natural and 
crafted” (Haraway 1991, 174), technology serving as a “second nature” (Braidotti 
2019, 120). The previously implicit need to control or master our environment 
should, with this sense of interconnectedness, diminish as well (Hayles 1999, 289-
290).  
 2) The boundary between acting subjects is shattered on the vertical axis as well, the 
hierarchy of beings is dissolved, humans loose the privileged status. They become 
collaborative entities (Braidotti 2019, 107) with relational ethics. Posthuman 
subjectivity emerges in correlation to non-human actors, where thinking is, to a 
certain degree, a shared activity (Hayles 1999, 289-290; Braidotti 2019, 107; 
Braidotti 2013, 60 and 193 etc.). "Thinking consists of bringing these structures into 
coordination so they can shape and be shaped by one another” (Hayles 1999, 290).  
The result of these two accounts is an ontology of heterogenous multiplicities, with no 
distinction between born, created and manufactured, and instead differentiating them 
according to their power that shows in their ability to affect and be affected (Braidotti 
2019, 120). The affectionate praxis becomes a way of constructing these new 
assemblages, that are not given in advance, but rather “composed and enacted”
16
 
(Braidotti 2019, 122). The subjectivity is thus a political subjectivity that does not 
submit itself to the Kantian model of an agent of universal norms anymore (Braidotti 
2013, 38–39). 
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 “We can therefore speak of forces that are above, below and alongside the subjects, in a 
constant flow of mutual imbrication. Going ‘above ’the subject points to the supra-subjective 
face of institutional and social power. ‘Below ’the subject operate the sub-subjective and 
affective factors, including the singular psychic landscapes. And ‘alongside ’the subjects there 




Hayles claims that this new conceptualisation does not jeopardise the identity of the 
human, but more so enhances it: as we try to understand the “interplay” of the world as 
a system, we more so understand the human as the part of it (Hayles 1999, 289-290) and 
it becomes easier to coordinate our human lives accordingly. This vitalist philosophy 
aims to get rid of individuality with the claim that “life is not exclusively human” 
(Braidotti 2019, 105-106). “Seen in this perspective, the prospect of humans working in 
partnership with intelligent machines is not so much a usurpation of human right and 
responsibility as it is a further development in the construction of distributed cognition 
environments, a construction that has been ongoing for thousands of years” (Hayles 
1999, 289-290). The idea of the not-only-human subjectivity is being further developed 
by Braidotti under the term zoe  (the Greek term for non-human and therefore non-
political life) - as opposed to bios (the special manner in which a life is spent, a life of a 
human as a citizen) (2019, 32). Just as Haraways cyborg, zoe implies a greater degree of 
functional connectedness: it is greater than a single subject, but still actualised in each 
in the sense of “self-expression”, “joy”, “endurance”, “affectivity” and “freedom” (ibid. 
110 and else throughout). It is pure vitality, but not completely free of pain or limitation 
(ibid. 310; 2013, 60 and 91). The difference between the human and the nonhuman lies 
only in the “difference of intensity, with all of reality participating to its own degree, 
even if only minimally, in a willing, larval or sensible subjectivity” (Meillassoux 2016, 
124). Subjects are neither autonomous nor unitary but rather highly embedded 
(Braidotti 2019, 106-107) - though still embodied.  
Despite Braidotti making it clear that these notions should be divorced from psychology 
(2019, 106), not-only-human zoe
17
 nevertheless becomes intelligible through the 
phenomenology of human life and experience. This renders Braidotti’s ideas somehow 
paradoxical; the individuality resurfaces in exposition of its attributes (Meillassoux 
2016, 120). Her critique of certain mode of subjectivity (that has been historically 
chosen as fundamental, e.g. reason, volition, the Cogito) is still permeated by traits of 
human subjectivity (e.g., self-expression, affectivity), now using them to explain the 
entirety of reality. Human becomes but one of the expressions of his/her own attributes, 
“not sensible man, but a Sensibility that is sometimes human but very often something 
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 It is also interesting that she’s trying to use a non-political term for the representation of an idea that is 




else” (Meillassoux 2016, 125). The critique of the humanist subject which aims for de-
anthropocentrisation of nature leads to the surprising anthropomorphism of nature 
where even non-human reality is seen in a degree of traits of our human existence. “If 
there was ever a way of placing oneself at the summit of all things, it was surely to 
place oneself in all things in a most diluted state” (Meillassoux 2016, 126). It seems that 
it is not possible to escape our own subjectivity when discussing life. 
 
Nevertheless, this proposal of metaphysical openness of the human creates space that 
may lead to greater political and ethical awareness of locale of the human, nonhuman 
and their environments, particularly with regard to “pressing issues like climate change, 
depletion of natural resources, the destruction of biodiversity, global migration flows, 
terrorism and insecurity, biopolitics etc.” (Braidotti 2014) For Katherine Hayles, the 
probability of the posthuman future is not a matter of question; instead rather asking 
“what kind
18
 of posthumans we will be?” (1999, 246; Braidotti 2019, 167). Locating the 
human in the posthuman becomes a discursive project. Postanthropocentric 
posthumanities of (critical) cultural posthumanism create an analysis of human agency 
as enmeshed in broader technological, environmental and cultural atmosphere, as well 
as in completely new, virtual realities in which the emergence of posthumans is 
understood as but one aspect of the technogenesis of the nature-wide socio-
technological network. Even though its metaphysical implications are not completely 
worked out yet and are less fruitful than its authors initially anticipated, they do provide 
a valuable starting point and generative tool for further re-evaluations of our 
anthropologies. 
The conclusion is thus two-fold: the posthuman transformation is already present and 
secondly, that it is opening up discursive processes regarding anthropological, social, 
political and ethical problems. (Braidotti 2019, 107-108) 
 
 
1.5 Speculative posthumanism 
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Speculative posthumanism is a philosophical inquiry into beings that do not yet exist. 
Its proponents claim that the “descendants of current humans could cease to be human 
by virtue of a history of technical alteration” (Roden 2015, 107). Those descendants 
could be either biological or technological (e.g. synthetic life forms, uploaded minds, 
AI) and may even be so radically different and weird in comparison to human beings 
today, that we are not just unable to imagine them, but also unable to comprehend their 
existence even if it were somehow disclosed to us (Roden 2015, 6). We can compare 
our difficulty in imagining this future with the example of a 1890s child trying to 
conceive of a holographic Gorillaz concert of 2010
19
; a  seemingly impossible task.  
 
Speculative posthumanism’s main proponent is David Roden. His methodology is 
different from all previously mentioned approaches to posthuman life in this thesis 
(even though most other forms of posthumanism employ some degree of speculation, 
too). It should not be confused with the transhumanist intellectual endeavour to 
speculate on human futures for the purpose of exploring the possible outcomes of their 
desired policies. The speculation in speculative posthumanism does not denote a 
calculation of scenarios of what could have happened (probability), but simply posits 
that there may exist a future entity that will not possess the same kind of subjectivity 
that is intelligible to us today (contingency). In comparison with transhumanistic 
speculation, speculative posthumanism does not hold normative claims about 
technologically advanced beings that will be no longer called human (Roden 2015, 9); it 
does not  compare  today’s human to the future one either in a positive or negative 
manner, and does not hold an opinion on its desirability (David Roden s.v. »Speculative 
Posthumanism,« in: Posthuman Glossary). Nevertheless, this does not mean that it does 
not imply any political and/or moral considerations, these will only become relevant 
when the posthuman actually emerges (ibid.). 
 
Speculative posthumanism shares the opposition to human-centric thinking with 
cultural posthumanism (Roden 2015, 20-21). However, the content of their critique is 
not the same.  
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David Roden’s thought is greatly influenced by speculative realism, a movement in 
contemporary philosophy that is developing distinct ways of speculation about 
empirically unattainable worlds. Speculative posthumanism, similarly, tries to 
speculatively explore the (empirically unattainable) posthuman possibility. David 
Roden’s speculation, then, going beyond the critique of cultural posthumanism, 
“opposes the human-centric thinking about the long-run implications of modern 
technology” (David Roden s.v. »Speculative Posthumanism,« in: Posthuman Glossary) 
by metaphysical exploration of the kinds of entities that could exist in the (future) world 
(ibid.). He understands the emergence of the posthuman as somehow analogous to the 
point of history in evolution at which the vast step-difference between the early 
primates and the human is pinpointed in the emergence of consciousness (2015, 21-22). 
Just as the primate brain evolved a property for consciousness thus rendering a human; 
human consciousness can evolve to become posthuman. Roden notes that some widely 
received ideas in cognitive science and biology, based on the presumption of modest 
materialism (e.g. that capacity for self-consciousness, language and information 
processing depend on physical organisation of our body, as well as on physical 
properties of our environment) indirectly imply that, when physical manipulation (or 
technological alteration) of those capacity-supporting bodily structures happens, the 
“subjective properties that rely on them” may be radically altered as well (Roden 2015, 
5). This means that what we understand as consciousness today may be undergoing an 
evolutionary step-change in the future. Just as we can not say anything definitive about 
the posthuman, we also can not know what the ‘medium’ or mechanism of his/her 
emergence will be (ibid. 400) (e.g. creation of superintelligence, mind uploading, 
synthetisation of life forms,… or by the means of that-which-is-not-yet-named). We 
currently do not know if any of those have a “posthuman-making potential” (ibid. 399). 
 
All those considerations noted, it is hard to grasp why exactly should we ponder on 
those distant  and ungraspable futures and how to understand them in relation to humans 
today, if they are indeed so vastly different. To aid with that, Roden proposed a 
‘constraint’ of the posthuman. It lays in the disconnection thesis, which follows the 




moment of future evolution, at which it will “act independently of the ‘Wide Human’20 – 
the interconnected system of institutions, cultures, individuals and technological 
systems whose existence depends on biological (‘narrow’) humans” (2015, 109–13 and 
David Roden s.v. »Speculative Posthumanism,« in: Posthuman Glossary). The 
disconnection of the posthuman is in them being able to, due to technological alteration, 
acquire an autonomy (independent agency), visible in their ends and roles that are not 
set by humans (ibid.). To paint the kind of case(s) of technogenesis that Roden has in 
mind, he introduces the (philosophical and at least for now, fictional) notion of 
“technological singularity” (Roden 2015, 63). The latter would be the product of 
“accelerating recursive improvements in artificial intelligence (AI) technology” (David 
Roden s.v. »Speculative Posthumanism,« in: Posthuman Glossary), by which AI would 
yield an even greater (general
21
) intelligence system or even gradually improve on its 
own intelligent abilities. Consequently, the self-enhancing (general) artificial 
intelligence could develop abilities beyond the scope of the humans’, emerging as a 
posthuman mind. The workings of the posthuman mind(s) could be untraceable and 
uncomprehensive to the mind of a/the human
22
. The main advantage of the 
disconnection thesis is, furthermore, that it accounts for the difference between human 
and posthuman without employing the notion of human (rational or other) essence that 
is so quick to burden posthumanists (ibid.). It subsumes the totality of human from “the 
world of Pleistocene hunter-gatherers to the modern, inter-connected world” (ibid.), 
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 ‘Wide Human’ is one of central notions of Roden’s philosophy, based on the idea that humans as 
members of a biological population actively alter their environment and as a consequence, the 
environment alters its selection pressures (on humans). By changing our environment, we change 
ourselves. Wide Human thus includes the totality of the biological population of Homo Sapiens, including 
all of the technical and social systems (e.g. cities, financial markets, language) that are created and 
controlled by them or depend on their maintenance. Using an analogy, Roden understands the Wide 
Human as an animal and ‘narrow’ or biological humans as their vital organs, hinting on a dependency 
going the other way, too: it is more and more obvious that people need a distinct technical and cultural 
infrastructure to function and stay alive. Wide Human as an organism leads its organs and maintains their 
being. (Roden 2015, 111) 
Seeing this intermeshment of technological and social systems leading the life and progress of the Wide 
Human, Roden understands the evolution of today’s humans as one of the results of the “technogenesis of 
a planet-wide assemblage composed of biological humans locked into networks of increasingly ‘lively’ 
and ‘autonomous’ technical artefacts” (2015, 111; Haraway 1991, 149-181). It will be this same 
assemblage of Wide Human that will render the conditions for posthuman emergence. (Roden 2015, 111) 
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 As already footnoted earlier in this thesis: While today’s artificial intelligences (AI) solve a lot of the 
tasks better and faster than an average human being, those AI are domain-specific. In general (regarding 
the spectrum of tasks that we can solve), humans are still better task-solvers. AGI is a hypothetical 
machine intelligence that would be able to master any task that a human being can. 
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escaping all generalisations and abstractions. By the disconnection lying only in the 
degree of independence of agency, the posthuman is in no way understood in relation to 
any kind of transcendental conception of the human (ibid.). Speculative posthumanism 
goes even further (than other posthumanisms) in trying to eliminate anthropomorphic 
explanations of the world, and, even, anthropomorphic explanations of the posthuman. 
Speculative posthumanism, similarly to cultural posthumanism, implies an assemblage 
ontology, by which posthumans would need to be functionally autonomous 
assemblages.   
 
Posthumans would be autonomous, if they would be able to “actively preserve 
the conditions for their continued existence” (Roden 2015, 136) and “engage in 
activities that supported its existence and which would thus also depend on the 
other processes constituting the posthuman life.” (ibid.) According to Roden, 
autonomy lies in “responsive, adaptable organization whose resiliency depends 
on there being multiple, mutually supporting processes which – in complex 
organisms – can also generate the internal variation on which adaptive 
responsiveness depends” (ibid. 135). A functionally autonomous being is able to 
both actively gain further functions and recruit other beings/entities, locking 
them in functional relations (ibid. 128).  
 
Posthumans would be assemblages
23
 as far as they would not have an essential 
purpose or function, but would be able to “lose or acquire functions to become 
posthuman” (Roden 2015, 125). An assemblage is a “specific functional 
arrangement of heterogeneous flows and interactions, a concrete set-up of 
connections between humans and machines that ensures both the coding and 
decoding of fluxes of matter, energy, and signs (information)” (Johnston 2008, 
107). The peculiarity of the assemblage lays in its ability to be decomposed and 
reconstructed: each of its components/parts “can be detached from the whole to 
exist independently (assemblages are thus opposed to “totalities” in an idealist or 
holist sense)” (Roden 2015, 111). 
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Assemblage is thus a new notion that is able to subsume a variety of objects, processes 
and events, as well as social organisations (e.g. primitive, barbarian, capitalist - 
Johnston 2008, 112) and populations (Roden 2015, 125), but also individual organisms 
or “psychic structures” (Johnston 2008, 112). The assemblage does not look for the 
elimination of what we know by the term human, but rather resituates it in a web of 
functions
24
 (Johnston 2008, 110). Both humans and posthumans, then, belong to the 
category of the functionally autonomous assemblage. Even though Roden does not 
write extensively about the status of today’s human, it is possible to extrapolate on his 
ideas to understand the today’s human either as a part of or its own assemblage. For 
example, an already existing assemblage that includes humans and technical machines 
was mentioned in the introduction of this thesis as a cybernetic fusion of the war aircraft 
and the pilot (Wiener 1989, 26). The technology is thus, by this view, not simply “out 
there” for humans to use, but forms a network of environment with which humans are 
deeply and ontologically intertwined (Johnston 2008, 112). The boundary between the 
subject and the technology is, by the notion of assemblage, collapsed, while natural 
evolution is considered as continued in the self-generating technological sense 
(Johnston 2008, 21). This so-called assemblage ontology is then highly pluralistic 
(Roden 2015, 125) and serves as a critique of the common understanding of technology 
as a bare tool for “realization of pre-existent human values” (Johnston 2008, 116), rather 
understanding machines as subjects or parts of subjects. 
 
It, still, remains unclear what the technologies of posthuman emergence will be. This 
also implies that any to the posthuman life connected discourses will need to wait for its 
emergence (e.g. its detailed anthropology or ethics). According to speculative 
posthumanism there is no posthuman yet, “only multiple lines of posthuman becoming 
and experimentation with posthuman forms of life and being” (David Roden s.v. 
»Speculative Posthumanism,« in: Posthuman Glossary). 
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 Because the nature of assemblage is modular, the intertwining assemblages are able to gain and 
produce new functions by encountering each other: for example, if we regard language/symbol-system as 
a cultural assemblage and a human as a biological assemblage, the coupling between them increases the 
functional autonomy of the second (and, ultimately, vice versa) (Roden 2015, 144), producing a sapient 
human. By being modular, they are highly adaptable and can produce fruitful couplings. The 
disconnection would then most likely happen as a “singular event produced by an encounter between 
assemblages” with high functional autonomies (e.g. two or more cases of advanced technologies) (Roden 









2. Can/should Christian posthumanism exist? 
 
My introduction of posthumanisms observes the new situation in which, after the rise 
and fall of 20th century humanism, humans are finding ways to reshape and redefine 
themselves. The inverted Turing test that I opened this thesis with is not just a thought 
experiment, but a very tangible reality of the human being who’s asking about one’s 
own identity today. The change we notice is happening on both the concrete (e.g. 
introduction of technology in our bodies, not just as a tool but as a constitute) and 
ideological level (e.g. in an attempt to erase the line between the historically more and 
less human: women, people of color, disabled). As (post)humans are being re-
contextualised, their relationship to others (humans, animals, AI, God?) is reinstated as 
well. How would posthumanisms then tackle the inverted Turing test? How would they 
articulate the human humanness when facing the machine, animal, the other? If we 
retrace the main propositions of the three discussed lines of posthumanistic thought, we 
can observe some disparity between them, not only in their methodology, but in the 
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Table 1 (partly based on David Roden s.v. »Speculative Posthumanism,« in: Posthuman 
Glossary) 
 
The initial objective of this thesis was to map the existing thoughts in, and authors of 
posthumanism to assess if their engagements can be distilled to a common point of 
reference or whether a shared notion can be deduced. It proves a difficult task to assess 
all of the posthumanisms at once as they present such a variety of points they’re making 
and ontologies that steam from them. I argue that the numerous lines of critique 
themselves serve as proof of the very dissolution of coherence attributable to 
postmodernity, especially in the hardship of grasping the notion of human being. It 
seems like the more knowledge we produce, the harder it is to cohere it to a single 
narrative. The question of “who’s (a) human?” remains no less unanswerable than at the 
beginning of this thesis.  
 
Nevertheless, I propose an engagement with posthumanisms, in which I aim to 
accentuate precisely what the main issues in thinking the human in the technological era 




the understanding of what it means to be human, inversely become trapped in the 
“technological thinking”, stripping the subject of its transcendence by diminishing it 
only to its ability to act and affect. 
 
 - Technology as an “instrument”/“means to an end” (Instrumentum, Einrichtung) 
for human enhancement 
Technology often appears to exist as the means to our ends, a certain human activity 
that can be controlled completely. In accordance with this, technological posthumanism 
sees technology as the neutral tool by which the essence of what it means to be human 
can be produced and reproduced to accentuate the humanness of the human — to make 
us better, faster, stronger. According to Heidegger, this instrumental attribute of 
technology is not wrong, but it does not reveal the true essence of technology and does 
not allow us to understand what our relationship to technology truly is (Heidegger 1977, 
3-4). 
 
Let us see why: when we instrumentalize things by understanding them as something to 
impose on or be challenged for technical use, we render the world a resource, a standing 
reserve (Bestand) (Heidegger 1977, 17). This can be seen, for example, in the case of 
explaining something according to its use-value, rather as ‘good for’ than ‘good’. As 
soon as we start to evaluate and order the world as a reserve, as ‘good for’, it does not 
stand on its own to us anymore, but always in relation to our freedom and power to 
disrupt it. However what we are quick to miss is how this kind of instrumental view on 
technology, as Heidegger names it: enframing (Gestell) (1977, 19), aims to manipulate, 
not just technology, but us alike. When beings are known to us just as being at our 
disposal, it is inevitable that humans will in turn be seen as resources, too: man is being 
“subordinate to the orderability” of his own making (Heidegger 1977, 18) when he is 
tied, for example, by the demands of his own industries, that, by the ties of profit, 
control him just a little less than he controls them. The same can be seen in the humanist 
framework of technological posthumanism, where the mind as an informational pattern 
is separated from the body, reduced to standing reserve for the application on another 
technology — a microchip — which is in itself a standing reserve, waiting to be used 





 - Technology as a “human activity” 
It is however not unnatural to see the world this way. Enframing is not a mere 
imposition of human ordering on the world, but the world itself reveals itself as being 
able to be ordered (Heidegger 1977, 12). Technology then, is a form of disclosure that 
requires beings to present themselves as defined, as clear as possible so that their 
availability is maximized (e.g. in technological posthumanism: the reduction of human 
identity to an informational pattern, a code that we’re able to upload to a computer). 
Science, in turn, responds to this availability in manufacturing technological devices. It 
becomes clear, then, that technology is not a mere “instrument”, but is present in 
essence in the way we understand and perceive the world. The mistake made by man is 
in seeing this kind of apprehending as the only mode of revealing, trapping him in 
seeing the skeleton of reality as the entirety of it (Heidegger 1977, 20). Technological 
enframing then poses a threat: when we discuss the world only in the sense of the 
availability of its entities we are thus concealing our capacity for world disclosure as “it 
drives out every other possibility of revealing” (Young 2002, 50) 
 
What we conclude, then, is that even though it becomes most apparent in modern 
technology, technological thinking is not the result, but the cause of everything 
technological (Heidegger 1977, 4). The essence of technology lies not in the 
technological, but in the mode of being’s revealing. Enframing is neither an “only 
human activity nor a mere means within such activity” (Heidegger 1977, 21) making 
the anthropomorphisation of technology inadequate, too. 
 
 - Technology understood as an “interacting network” (Gewirk) and (post)human 
as a part of it 
Cultural posthumanism differently criticises the practices of segregation and divide that 
the language of essence of humanism brings about. It does indeed discover and 
correctly define this understanding of human being as problematic, seemingly making 
the first step towards making space for the discussion of being by acknowledging that 
we have been seeing the world and its inhabitants in this restrictive way. As a response 




establishing a notion of relational agency, by which the difference between humans, 
machines and others disappears when the conception of agency that can be 
homogeneously applied is introduced (Beinsteiner 2019, 119). Beinsteiner argues that, 
despite their attempt to rescue beings from the “technoscientific regime of accessibility 
to reach the sphere where a subversion of the technological, military or capitalist 
dynamics of enhancement becomes thinkable” (2019, 118), they remain bound to the 
same techno-scientific stance which tends to emphasise agency only in the sense of 
causa efficiens (ibid.). 
 
The problem lies in our understanding of (technological) agency (or efficient causality). 
Heidegger shows the nature of technological causality by comparing it to Aristotle’s 
understanding of causality as the nurturing causality. By the latter, a silversmith would 
carefully consider the chalice “to reveal” it, so it could come into being not by wrestling 
with it, but rather gently caring to bring about its potentiality. This irreducible 
multiplicity of causes
25
 that pro-duce (or bring-forth) the chalice is today transformed 
into a rather simplistic version of efficient causality that disregards the complexity of 
how beings can be assisted rather than forced upon in their revealing. Conversely, in the 
modern age of reality revealing itself in the mode of techno-science, how we approach 
knowledge is a unique process, too. The source of scientific methodology is technology 
(or technological thinking), which introduces science to its “ambition of making a 
causally effective (Bewirkende) intervention” (Beinsteiner 2019, 117). Modern 
technology is therefore not subordinate or subsequent to science, but rather a 
phenomenon brought about by the essence of technological thinking (Heidegger 1977, 
21–23). The uniqueness of the methodology (theory
26
) of modern science can be seen in 
approaching knowledge in the sense of striving (Trachten), “i.e., the manner of its 
entrapping-securing procedure” (Heidegger 1977, 169), rather than of observing (Be-
trachten, contemplatio). This still does not entail that man would impose his own 
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 “For centuries philosophy has taught that there are four causes : (1) the causa materialis, the material, 
the matter out of which, for example, a silver chalice is made; (2) the causa formalis, the form, the shape 
into which the material enters; (3) the causa finalis, the end, for example, the sacrificial rite in relation to 
which the chalice required is determined as to its form and matter; (4) the causa efficiens, which brings 
about the effect that is the finished, actual chalice, in this instance, the silversmith. What technology is, 
when represented as a means, discloses itself when we trace instrumentality back to fourfold causality.” 
(Heidegger 1977, 6) 
26 “Theoria in itself, and not only through the utility attaching to it, is the consummate form of human 




construction upon reality, but he does represent reality to himself, not allowing for 
things to emerge as they are (which would be the case of observing in contemplatio). 
Man builds conceptual systems that he forever deems imperfect, altering them to suit, 
allowing him to explain it. 
 
According to Haraway, the importance of agency is seen in connection to feminist 
theory, where “the ‘body’ is an agent, not a resource” (Haraway 1991, 200). Similarly, 
Braidotti introduces “ontological relationality, which is the power to affect and be 
affected” (Braidotti 2019, 125). And in speculative posthumanism, Roden’s 
assemblages “reinforce the generality of the concept /…/ of /…/ ‘agency’” (Roden 
2015, 184) under the notion of functional autonomy. What they all do is put the notion 
of agency forward as the defining commonality of entities that may have before been 
unacknowledged as such, understanding reality as an interacting “network of causes and 
effects” (Beinsteiner 2019, 125). Even though their proponents recruit slightly different 
notions of (post)humanness, both cultural and speculative posthumanism converge on 
their attribute defining a as serve to individual an of agency the accentuating of strategy.   
 
Distributed agency of the interacting network (Gewirk) (Heidegger 1977, 168) is 
precisely the “surveyable series of related [causally effective] causes” (Heidegger 1977, 
168) by which reality is being exhibited by science in the technological era. By it, 
beings are being assembled into a network whereby their meaning arises from their 
availability to serve a cause. I argue that the diction of patternism (transhumanism), 
ontological relationality (cultural posthumanism) and functional autonomy (speculative 
posthumanism) employ this techno-scientific thinking when discussing reality. This 
redistribution of agency does not abolish the problem of accessibility in causa efficiens, 
but rather simply displaces it. By levelling beings “to the lowest common denominator” 
of agency, they conceive beings as nothing more than causally effective and effecting 
entities, remaining in the techno-scientific mode of apprehension (Beinsteiner 2019, 





2.1 Can Christian posthumanism exist? 
 
This thesis aimed to discuss if the notion of the posthuman could be applied to Christian 
thought as well, thus answering the question: “Can Christian posthumanism exist?”. 
There has already been some debate on the topic, some of its voices being Jeanine 
Thweatt-Bates, Stephen Garner, Ted Peters, Elaine Graham and Brent Waters.  
 
To answer this question, we might first look at the human as understood by christian 
theologians. The prevalent christian anthropology is that of Imago Dei. The latter 
understands the human as the image of God as far as it is an analogy to his capacities. 
Even though we distinguish at least three different strands of understanding of what 
exactly image of God encompasses (namely: structural or classical view, functional 
view and relational view), Marc Cortez (2010, 14-40) gathered six propositions that 
most theologians would agree with:  
 
 - To ‘image ’God means to ‘reflect ’God in creation.  
 - ‘Image ’and ‘likeness ’are largely or entirely synonymous.  
 - The image of God includes all human persons. 
 - Sin has affected the image in some way.  
 - The image in the New Testament is a Christological concept.  
 - The image of God is teleological.  
 
There are several points that seemingly converge with some ideas and propositions of 
discussed posthumanisms
27
. For example, the last one proposes that the image of God is 
not a static notion, but is yet to be fulfilled in its entirety. Saint Paul writes about the 
image to be “transformed (2 Cor 3,18) and “renewed” (Col 3,10) as the person comes 
closer to its goal (telos), which is in Christ (Cortez 2010, 17). What it means to be 
human can therefore not be a fixed case but remains “a work in progress” (ibid.). It 
could be argued that transhumanism proposes the same: the human today is not yet 
complete, there is some suffering to get rid of and additional improvements to be made 
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 Interesting ones being “The image of God includes all human persons” and “Sin has affected the image 




for him to reach his full potential of “humanness”. Thus, transhumanism expresses a 
“human quest for transcendence” (Thweatt-Bates 2012, 44) by its own (technological) 
agency, while Christianity expects the same in salvation by divine agency (ibid.). Both 
strive for a new, “praised body” and death is for both the “ultimate enemy” (Stegu 
2019, 689). There exists a common yearning for transformation, but can it really be 
paralleled? 
 
This comparison has some pitfalls and holds its similarity only on the surface level. 
First, even though people have not yet reached the final destination of their being, the 
implication that they can do so by their own power only is unacceptable to Christian 
thought (Stegu 2019, 691). A similar heresy was once rejected by Christian theology: 
Pelagius preached for the power of the individual to build and transform himself to be 
perfect for God and therefore did not allow for the imperfections of the human body and 
soul (ibid.) — transhumanism aims to erase those imperfections, too.  
Secondly, for transhumanists, the body is of no real value, as the mind is understood as 
an informational pattern, “a disembodied intellect” (Thweatt-Bates 2012, 138), that can 
be applied to any substrate. Conversely, the body is highly valued in Christianity, as it 
serves as proof that we are “definitely made as God’s image” (Stegu 2019, 691), where 
the incarnation of Christ serves as a model for both: what is God and what is a human 
being (ibid.). “Humans were thus ‘predestined to become conformed to the likeness of 
his son’ (Rom 8,29)” (Cortez 2010, 17)
28
. The perfection of human life is then, in the 
paradox of Christianity, not reachable on this Earth, but it lies in the afterlife: “when we 
lose [life], we get the real life” (Stegu 2019, 691). The divergence in understanding of 
subject’s transcendence in transhumanism and Christianity then becomes apparent. 
Stegu shows this with st. Paul’s discussion on resurrection of bodies, when he’s 
answering the question of “How are the dead raised? With what kind of body will they 
                                                 
28 Peters additionally notes the scientific inadequacy of transhumanism:“The science of the brain and the 
technology of the brain, curiously, are dysfunctional. They are contradictory, at least in part. The 
tendency in the science is toward reductionism, toward reducing our minds and our souls to biological 
activity. The contrary tendency in transhumanist technology is to view the mind or soul as immaterial, as 
something that can become dis-embodied and re-embodied. The first tends toward a substance monism or 
materialism, the second toward a substance dualism.” (Peters 2006, 130-131) Theology, conversely, 
“recently reaffirmed the importance and goodness of embodied human existence, rejecting substance 
dualism, resulting in a contemporary Christian anthropology that celebrates our physical nature and 
emphasizes a relational and integrated understanding of human selfhood and personhood.” (Thweatt-




come?” (1 Cor 15,35) (Stegu 2019, 690). According to Paul the resurrected body is not 
fully identical to the earthly one: “I declare to you, brothers and sisters, that flesh and 
blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, nor does the perishable inherit the 
imperishable” (1 Cor 15,50). The corporeality of the human is then not only in his 
earthly body, but in the gift of “God's descent which is the one who opens the way for 
man not only to immortality, but also to deification” (Stegu 2019, 690). 
Transhumanists’ rejection of the human body as an anthropologically unimportant can 
be then rather paralleled to another heresy — the one of the prophet Mani — which 
condemned the body as “corrupt and evil and from which the soul needs to be saved” 
(Stegu 2019, 690-691).  
 
From the point of view of Christianity, technological posthumanism (this is: 
transhumanism) can be completely dismissed, as “it is scientifically and philosophically 
unrealistic as well as theologically and ethically misdirected” (Peters 2006, 125). 
 
While transhumanism traces the rational humanism of Enlightenment, cultural and 
speculative posthumanisms put forward a radical rejection of it in the form of refusal of 
any historical notion with which we were and are naming our human selves. It shows 
difficult to parallel the anthropology of cultural and speculative posthumanism to the 
Christian one, simply because the former does not exist. With its radical rejection of 
anthropological essentialism (ibid.) both remaining posthumanisms
29
 reject an 
anthropology in general. There can be no anthropology without the anthropos. Klun’s 
(2019, 592) critique of transhumanism could be applied to cultural and speculative 
posthumanism, too: because they both trump the anthropological essentialism, the 
question of how are we able to even speak about humans in the scope of posthumanistic 
thought, if we replace them with the more general notions of life, zoe, creatures 
etc .arises. Klun points out that we are nevertheless human (units), and thus the ones 
always choosing the matter in which we speak about ourselves, our future selves, or 
anything at all. Any self-understanding is self-transcendent, and human self-
                                                 
29 Especially with speculative posthumanism, the aspiration towards posthumanness seems tautological, 
as it tries to obliterate both the measure and what is measured. To attest that people ought to become 
posthuman requires the conjuring of a higher or transcendent good that bests the human-centric norm (if 
we really wish to get rid of it). It remains unclear in the writings on speculative posthumanism, where to 




transcendence “forms his basic structure and belongs to the ‘essence’ of man” (Klun 
2019, 592).  
 
Both cultural and speculative posthumanism reposition the human so that it is 
ontologically not different to other entities. Further critique therefore can not exist. 
 
 
2.2 Should Christian posthumanism exist? 
 
I will nevertheless further emphasise some ideas the explained posthumanisms carry 
that I deem important to elaborate and discuss on. Because those ideas are engagement 
worthy, I think Christian posthumanism should exist. I propose that Christian belief and 
philosophy carries a way of thinking, namely the symbolic or hermeneutics that could 
offer a truer understanding of the meaning of a human being and one’s situatedness in 
the world. 
 
I argued that the question of human being in the technological era can not be fully 
answered in the scope of philosophical discussions of posthumanism. Should Christian 
theology provide a different answer to the inverted Turing test, one that would 
circumvent the impasse of technological thinking? If we follow Heidegger’s view on 
the question of how being (and with it technology) reveals itself, then this question is 
fundamentally unanswerable. Even though is seems like the essence of human being is 
left behind, this same withdrawal serves both as a danger and a blessing, since the same 
technological enframing that renders machines, humans and animals disposable, at the 
same time reveals our dissatisfaction with the kind of revealing we support. “It is the 
enframing of the world in technological revealing, that calls us to see again” (Lewin 
2010, 192), because when we truly sense that our thinking enframes, we are 
simultaneously going beyond enframing to “see again” (ibid.). There is no straight-
forward answer to what this seeing consists of exactly, no definitive way of how to 
overstep this circle of enframing — as we may be still enframed by our very act of 
asking. Lewin parallels our situation with the discussion of achieving enlightenment (or, 
to parallel it with a Christian happening, we may equate it with general revelation (by 




certain steps as to how to reach it, neither can it be done by pure active will, there’s also 
a moment of passive receptivity where the goal discloses itself (but still through our 
disclosing). Just as there is no end in our discussion of how to reach enlightenment, we 
are compelled to discuss how are we supposed to go beyond enframing, without 
equating the method and its answer (Lewin 2010, 193). 
 
The technological era is quick to employ the one-dimensionality of thinking, where 
“everything is constructed and nothing is given” (or inversely sometimes present in 
theology: everything is in revelation and there is nothing subjective in it). It 
consequently often seems like philosophical and theological questioning are opposed in 
their approach. While the theologian is seen as the one to passively reflect upon 
revelation and therefore dependent on grace, the philosopher is the one to take control in 
his free, rational agency that does not “wait on grace” (Lewin 2010, 188). Lewin 
suggests that both philosophy and theology (and with it “passivity” and “activity”) 
actually intertwine: philosophy “oversteps into the realm of theology” just as said in 
Plato’s dialogues, where the “truth must be graciously received by the goddess truth, 
Aletheia” (Lewin 2010, 188). Similarly, theology does not lie in wait for the divine 
grace to be illuminated, but combines both the natural (philosophical) and supernatural 
(revelation) (Klun 2019a, 377) to understand the world. The workings of theology then 
can not circumvent philosophical, scientific and technological. In its history, it has 
exhibited this dialectics of communication between revelation, tradition and the signs of 
times
30
 more than once and it would be appropriate to suggest that it will do it again. 
Theological method, then, should be in constant dialogue with contemporary 
philosophical debate (Lewin 2010, 189). This is why, in some sense, I propose that 
some kind of Christian posthumanism should exist. 
 
Ideas of the kind like posthumanism, that do not account for (a) (g)God, are sometimes 
quick to be dismissed by theologians, pointing out to the (godless and revelationless) 
posthumanisms’ completely different method of approaching and describing reality. 
One important observation put forward by Jeanine Thweatt-Bates is in the tendency to 
                                                 
30
 The notion of signs of times was popularised around second Vatican council and denotes the necessity 




over-generalize those movements and therefore dismiss them as a whole, while we 
could, with some “healthy specificity” take them as conversation partners (Thweatt-
Bates 2012, 10). I do think that more so than posthumanisms’ ontological 
predispositions (which may or may not be thought through by their authors), the sole 
existence of those lines of thought point to a vast and growing interest, worry and need 
of — humans — to locate themselves (once more). Posthumanism should, being a 
lively contemporary philosophical debate, earn further theological engagement with it, 
and be taken seriously as a sign of times. If the goal of Christian anthropology lies in 
accurate understanding and portraying who a human being is, it should account for 
those (human) discourses, too. 
 
While I do agree with the previously elaborated critique of transhumanism, I propose 
that two other propositions of Christian anthropology could be understood in the scope 
of and found in cultural posthumanism, too: “The image of God includes all human 
persons” and “Sin has affected the image in some way” (Cortez 2010, 14-40). Both are 
implying that we, humans, tend to distort the image we were created to represent, which 
is precisely the point of cultural posthumanism that is often left out in theological 
debate. The cyborg then, on a more abstract level, can serve as a conversation point on 
three accounts: 
 - Being careful about what kind of language do we use for explaining human life and 
the kinds of people it encompasses. It is true that there is a great possibility of our 
language being exclusivist - the evidence of slavery (in the times BC), blackness (in 
colonial times), certain nationalities or religious identities (last century) being 
understood as unquestionably less-than human essences in the past speaks for a great 
possibility that similar practices might be present today, too. We should not grow 
content and comfortable with our definitions and aim to always refine them to suit 
the reality. This, of course at some point also includes the ethical conversations 
regarding the start and end of human life (abortion and palliative care/life 
prolongation). Cultural posthumanism here actually employs the narrative of 
existentialism, where existence precedes the essence of Cartesian “I think therefore I 
am” (1644, 30). Cartesian identity is shaped by the thoughts and ideas of ratio, where 
they tend to reduce, control and totalize thus understanding beings as nothing more 




agency in the sense of causa efficiens, but more so in our aptitude for relationality: 
when we encounter another person, we always experience something more than 
every category or idea we have of them. And even though we may never be able to 
precisely express this “something more”, we should continue to try and approach it. 
The role of theology is here similar to the one cultural posthumanism has chosen for 
itself: to find/show the value of the human being not in their attributes, but more so in 
their relationship to o(O)ther. The image of God entails “radical inclusivity” 
(Thweatt-Bates 2012, 142) of “all human persons” (Cortez 2010, 14-40). Both living 
as an image of God and “living as cyborg means recognition that the boundaries 
constructed to delineate the self cut across the predetermined categories” (Thweatt-
Bates 2012, 151). 
 
 - A call to make a connection between anthropology and ecology. I have already noted 
how an anthropology in cultural and speculative posthumanism does not really exist, 
as it rather calls for inclusion of other beings to the assemblages of the posthuman or 
cyborg. This renders their anthropology an ecology, not focusing on particular bodies 
anymore, but the relationships among them, not just between humans, but also to 
other beings. Thweatt-Bates suggests that similar work is to be done in theology as 
well, where the image of God goes beyond the rational minds and bodies (as it is 
with transhumanism) to rather demonstrate “its capability for inclusivity and 
beneficence for all humans, posthumans, and nonhumans who together inhabit God’s 
creation” (Thweatt-Bates 2012, 12). We are not created to live in a vacuum, but to 
inhabit a world with other creatures, for which are we responsible, but also depend 
on them. Our relationship to other animals and natural habitat in general is the one 
that will form the world in which the future images of God (our children) will live in 
and be raised by. “Theological engagements with the cyborg, therefore, turn to the 
ecotheological implications of the cyborg’s hybridity, materiality, and 
interconnectedness” (Thweatt-Bates 2012, 142). 
 
 - The need for carefulness about what and who do we build and construct, not just 
metaphorically (with language), but also physically (in the scope of technological 
advancement). In this sense our debate moves to an ethical one, where, for example, 




questions regarding how can we move about the technologies to not use it to distort 
our being. The sin that may affect our image then lies not only in our vocabulary, but 
also on the physical level.  
 
 
In addition to those conversation points, I suggest that a mystical approach in theology 
can acknowledge and appropriately respond to the “impasse of technological thinking 
by breaking the circularity of constructivism” (Lewin 2010, 194) that was not 
completely circumvented by posthumanisms and thus offer a new methodology to 
explore the posthuman. The exchange of methods and approaches is thus possible the 
other way around, too. Mystical theology was solving this same divide of one-
dimensional understanding when it was questioning and discussing mystical experience. 
It seems like there are only two options, either mystical experience is a construct of the 
subjective mind or fully independent of it and simply received. Accepting neither of 
those options;  
 
Heidegger and Eckhart alike realize that the way to deal with the transcendent 
and ‘simply other ’reality (of God or Being) is not to deal with it at all, but to let it deal 
with us. What Heidegger realized along his path of thought – and it is this realization 
that brings him into the proximity of the mystics – is that Being is nothing that submits 
to human interpretation; it is in no way subordinate to human demands. The only way 
to gain access to Being itself is to let Being be and let it address man. Now that is 
something every mystic knows. The way of the soul to God is to let God take the lead 
and to let God effect the unity of the soul with God (Caputo 1986, 25). 
 
The Heideggerian notion of observing (Be-trachten, contemplatio) as the opposite of 
technological striving (Trachten) can be, for example, noticed in the medieval practice 
of prayer, where the praying employs both the notions of activity and passivity. 
Similarly to Heidegger explaining the pro-duction of the chalice, Pseudo-Dionysius the 
Areopagite uses the metaphor of sculptor that lets the sculpture of “God come into 
presence” by the function of poiesis of techne. In this kind of pro-duction (or bringing-
forth), being takes the lead (Lewin 2010, 202). Similarly to exploring being (or God), I 




change or re-fashion ourselves, but more so by the initiative of the partnership with the 
being. Like the silversmith carefully considers to reveal the chalice and sculptor finds 
the shape within the stone, we as well need ourselves/are required for the pro-duct to 
come about. But, same as with the chalice and sculpture, we might need the direction 
that is beyond our limits. We do not need to speak about God (though it may be 
introduced later in the debate, if we would be to follow this trajectory), only the 
“freedom to follow and affirm what is. It is, we might say, an ontological freedom” 
(Lewin 2010, 203). This is the point, at which we realize that a concern for the ultimate 
can never be entirely absent. Either we name it ‘being ’or ‘God’, and even if we may 
not be aware of it at any moment, it is the one that leads us not towards simply 
determining or inventing our humanness, but in discovering it (and letting it discover 
us). This question then, goes beyond the effects and artefacts of technological devices. 
 
The ways of thinking in mystical theology will not be further explored in this thesis. In 
the constant process of self-examination that should be present in theological discourse, 
I equally welcome the mystical or any other methodology that could lead the way of 
this ontological discovery. The ontological concern is therefore the same as the ultimate 
concern: we can be grasped, seized and transfigured only, if we choose to “participate in 







In exploring posthumanisms, we have noticed the pitfalls of one-dimensional thinking 
that is present in biblical interpretation, ethical debate and philosophical discourse. Its 
nature is in totalization, where it disallows questioning (or employs it, but then rebuilds 
the disassembled notions to construct ones that are not dissimilar). It is somehow ironic 
that, while humanism destroyed the little that was left from the historical and implicit 
hermeneutics, it, at the same time, triggered a reply where different lines of thought try 
to think beyond the strict and universal notions to reach an explicit hermeneutics 
(Lewin 2010, 151).  
According to posthumanisms that I have outlined in this thesis, we might suspect that 
their common denominator is not in the particular image of the posthuman that they 
would all unanimously employ, but more so in their utterance of importance to engage 
with it. Categories that have fixed limits and stable definitions are, in today’s world, 
bound to fail, and even aggravate the anxieties that drove the man to fix them in the first 
place. Still, there is no need for total annihilation or destruction of those notions. In my 
opinion, the better solution is to acknowledge that we can never truly “touch man”, not 
because of his transcendence but because of his continuous creation. Cultural 
posthumanism, can then serve as a method of questioning, a search for a criterium of 
“being human” that acknowledges the time and place in which we live today.  
 
There is far more that could be discussed regarding how those same characteristics of 
our time could be noticed in the development of Christian theology (and with it 
anthropology), too. It is the case of techno-science and religion similarly that it often 
forbids the meaning to be truly carried in truth. The truth of man is not to be found in 
fair ordering of human (and other) beings, but in taking up the ever-lasting task of 
continuing to explore it (and let us be explored). I have suggested that mystical theology 
may be a way to produce a method that would go beyond freeze-framing, isolating and 
imaging of the human being from the flow of his real (constantly re-realized and re-
represented) meaning. This is, nevertheless, just a suggestion that still needs to be 










Ali more/mora obstajati krščanski posthumanizem? 
 
Naloga vsebuje dva cilja. Njen prvi cilj je analizirati mnoštvo pogledov na človeška 
bitja danes, kot jih prikazujejo in secirajo tako kritične kot spekulativne filozofije 
postmoderne dobe. Ta pregled služi kot poskus predstavitve in razjasnitve izraza 
"posthumanizem" v naslovu diplomskega dela. Naloga nadalje pokaže, kako se te 
spremembe v razumevanju, kaj pomeni biti človek, srečujejo in prepletajo ter preko njih 
prikaže izzive tehnološkega mišljenja. Kot zadnje jih vzporedi s krščanskim 
razumevanjem istega vprašanja. 
Drugi cilj diplomskega dela je v poskusu odgovora na vprašanje "Ali more/mora 
obstajati krščanski posthumanizem?" 
 
Ključne besede 
Tehnologija, religija, krščanstvo, človek, post-človek, posthumanizem, kiborg 
 
 
Can/should Christian posthumanism exist? 
 
This thesis contains two aims. The first is to analyse the conundrum of views on human 
beings today, as portrayed and dissected by both critical and speculative philosophies of 
postmodernity. This serves as a clarified representation of the term “posthumanism” in 
the thesis’s title. It furthermore shows how those developments in the understanding of 
what it means to be human converge and intertwine to show the challenges of 
technological thinking and parallels them to Christian understanding of the same issue. 
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